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DIGNIFIED ANIMALS:
HOW ―NON-KANTIAN‖ IS NUSSBAUM‘S CONCEPTION OF DIGNITY?

by
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Under the Direction of Dr. Christie Hartley

ABSTRACT
Martha Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity is integral to her capabilities approach. She argues that
dignity is rooted in the flourishing and striving of animals. Her view is distinct from Kant‘s, as Kant
claims that persons have dignity in virtue of their rational nature. Though Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity is important to her approach, its exact content and its relation to her thought is not clearly stated in
her work, and I will attempt to provide an overview of Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity. Also I will
compare and contrast Nussbaum‘s dignity with Kant‘s (and contemporary Kantians‘). Nussbaum provides four reasons for why her approach is superior to the Kantian split between rationality and animality,
all of which I will examine. Finally, I will look at three areas of Nussbaum‘s theory which require further
exploration.
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1
I. Nussbaum’s Conception of Dignity
Martha Nussbaum‘s capabilities approach is a political theory according to which the state should
provide certain central capabilities to all members of society as a matter of minimal justice.1 Her approach to justice ―starts from the notion of human dignity and a life worthy of it,‖ and she says, ―Its basic
moral intuition concerns the dignity of a form of life that possesses both abilities and deep needs.‖ 2 Certain capabilities, according to Nussbaum, partly comprise, ―a life with, or worthy of, human dignity.‖3
Human dignity, she says, is not grounded solely in rationality as some have claimed, but, instead, is
grounded in animality. This view allows her to claim that certain human beings with severe mental impairments have human dignity. She further argues that not only human beings have dignity but, also,
nonhuman animals. This inclusion of the severely mentally impaired and nonhuman animals within dignity‘s scope, she claims, better reflects common intuitions about justice than alternative accounts.4
Nussbaum recognizes she is working in a long tradition of philosophical thought concerning human dignity and its foundation. She traces the notion of the inviolability and equality in human dignity
back to the Stoics, who influenced a vast and varied array of future philosophers, including Kant and
Nussbaum herself. 5 The Stoics‘ believed dignity was a binary feature that one had in its entirety or lacked
completely, and, once bestowed, it needed no further development. They claimed human beings had
equal dignity and, consequently, deserved respect.6 Rational capacity is shared equally among humans,
reflects the divine, and is the root of moral worth. The worth of rational capacity is ―wonderful and worthy,‖ surpassing the social trappings of wealth and status. 7 The Stoics believed each human being has
rational capacity and is, thereby, a person to be respected equally with other persons. According to the
Stoic‘s conception, ―dignity of reason [which is the basis of the dignity of rational beings] is worthy of

1

Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2006), 71.
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 346.
3
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 162
4
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 171-9.
5
Martha Nussbaum, "Human Dignity and Political Entitlements," Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics (Washington DC, 2008), 352-4.
6
Nussbaum, ―Human Dignity and Political Entitlements,‖ 352.
7
Nussbaum, ―Human Dignity and Political Entitlements,‖ 352.
2

2
respect wherever it is found.‖ 8 For the Stoics, dignity is delineated as a central human feature and a
source of wonder: inviolable, equal among all people regardless of their external features or social position, and worthy of deep respect.
Nussbaum agrees that dignity is inviolable and equal among nearly all members of a species.
Nussbaum also recognizes that her intuitive ideas of dignity include the Stoics‘ reluctance to allow fortune to decide dignity.9 This means that those who are lucky, have more material goods, or who have
been gifted with certain talents do not have more dignity than others. Since the Stoics believed that the
basic moral capacity stemming from rationality is equal among people and the source of their dignity,
they thought the caprices of fortune do not influence the amount of dignity one has. 10 This is important
because it founds the sense that all humans share equal, inviolable dignity which is worthy of equal respect. However, Nussbaum does not fully identify her theory with that of the Stoics or their followers.
Nussbaum openly rejects the emphasis on human rationality that was present in the Stoics‘ conception
and influenced Kant. As we will see, rejecting the basis of dignity in rationality opens the door for Nussbaum‘s more inclusive account of justice which recognizes the dignity of both nonhuman animals and
human beings with severe mental impairments. 11 Also, she rejects the detachment from the world prevalent in Stoicism because, according to Nussbaum, we are also dignified in our need. 12 Kant‘s conception
of dignity was influenced by the Stoics and retains the emphasis on rationality as the basis of dignity.
Though admittedly ―non-Kantian,‖ Nussbaum realizes the important role that Kant‘s philosophy plays in
many contemporary theories of justice such as Rawls; hence, Nussbaum, addresses the superiority of her
view of dignity relative to Kant‘s or Kantian views.
In this thesis, I will investigate the content of Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity for both humans
and nonhuman animals. Dignity plays an important role in Nussbaum‘s capabilities approach, but she
does not often directly address its content or the precise way in which she uses it in her theory. In the re8
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3
mainder of this first section, I aim to clarify what Nussbaum means when she says ―dignity‖ and how it
fits into her capabilities approach. Nussbaum contrasts her conception of dignity with Kant‘s rationalitybased dignity. In order to better understand the differences between Nussbaum and Kant and the implications that those differences have, in the second section I will look at Kant‘s conception dignity as well as
the way two contemporary Kantians, Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood, interpret rationality-based
dignity. After I have explored Nussbaum‘s and Kant‘s conceptions of dignity, I will critically analyze the
differences between Kantian dignity and Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity in Section III. I argue that
Nussbaum‘s animality based dignity is better at addressing concerns regarding justice for nonhuman animals and humans with severe cognitive impairments. Though Nussbaum‘s broad conception of dignity
has many advantages for theories of justice, there are still some unanswered questions regarding Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity that I raise and explore in Section IV.

A. Human Dignity
As a neo-Aristotelian, Nussbaum says that human dignity arises from our status as ―political animals‖ and that animality underwrites human dignity.13 As political animals, ―the person is imagined as
having a deep interest in choice, including the choice of a way of life and of political principles that govern it,‖ while simultaneously, ―it stresses the animal and the material underpinnings of human freedom.‖ 14
Human dignity rests not in rationality, but rather in the flourishing, striving, and vulnerability that we
have as embodied creatures. Nussbaum‘s primary focus on animality rather than reason enables her conception of dignity to include human beings she believes are entitled to the central capabilities but who fail
to meet Kant‘s rationality requirements to be considered dignified, for example, some cognitively impaired humans. Nussbaum claims that intuitively children, the severely cognitively impaired, and those
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suffering from diseases which damage one‘s rationality still have human dignity and should have a life
worthy of it.15
In Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum discusses three particular people with different cognitive impairments. Philosopher Eva Kittay‘s daughter Sesha suffers from congenital cerebral palsy and severe
mental retardation, resulting in her inability to walk, talk, read, or care for herself. Nussbaum notes, however, that despite these difficulties, Sesha is affectionate, likes music, and visibly responds to others. 16
Nussbaum also shares with her reader stories of her nephew Arthur, who suffers from Aspberger‘s and
Tourette‘s syndrome. Though he is communicative, alert, and highly intelligent, he struggles with social
skills and cannot flourish in a normal school setting. Whether or not he will be able to live independently
is yet unknown.17 Finally, Nussbaum highlights Jamie Bérubé who has Down Syndrome, and ―loves B.B.
King, Bob Marley, and the Beatles. He can imitate a waiter bringing his favorite food, and he has a sly
verbal sense of humor.‖ 18 Nussbaum uses these examples of impaired children and young adults as intuitively dignified people whose needs must be meet in a just society.
Jamie, Arthur and Sesha all have atypical needs and require care at times to ensure their flourishing; however, Nussbaum notes that needing care is not limited only to those with severe disabilities.
Nussbaum refers to ―the fiction of competent adulthood.‖ 19 Nussbaum claims that Kantian, rationalitybased dignity fails to capture that non-impaired humans are not consistently rational over a lifetime. Given infancy, old age, sickness, and injury, no one can be described as fully rational and independent
throughout his or her entire life.20 There are many adult humans who, over the course of a life, remain in
dependent relationships with others due to physical, emotional, or psychological need, and ―these lifelong
states of asymmetric dependency are in many respects isomorphic to the states of infants and the elder-
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ly.‖21 Nussbaum claims that Kantian theories do not adequately reflect the reality and neediness of human life.22 By using animality as the basis of dignity, Nussbaum‘s account addresses the dependency of
human life and common intuitions of dignity; her conception of human dignity is able to account for the
cohesive dignity of a human being throughout all stages of his or her life.
Nussbaum notes the need for a more inclusive conception of human dignity than Kant‘s to meet
the intuition that almost all humans as such possess dignity. Again, as she says, ―The capabilities approach begins from a political conception of the human being and of a life that is worthy of the dignity of
the human being. A notion of the species and of the characteristic activities of a species does, then, inform it.‖23 The species norms upon which Nussbaum bases her central capabilities are developed by the
traits necessary for the flourishing of each species.24 Importantly, those born of human parents but lack a
―characteristic form of human life‖ would be excluded from Nussbaum‘s conception of human dignity
and, consequently, her capabilities approach. She describes such beings as near the medical definition of
dead, and she feels they would already be outside of the scope of our intuitive beliefs about human dignity.25
Though vague on the explicit content of human dignity, Nussbaum is clear about dignity‘s consequences and insists that it is a powerful and intuitive idea. 26 It is imperative in her approach that we
respect human dignity and work toward providing all people with a life worthy of human dignity (by
working to ensure the capabilities). Human dignity in her arguments is associated with not only being
born of human parents,27 but also with elements of being human. For example, Nussbaum associates human dignity with non-humiliation, self-respect, being treated as an end and not a mere means, giving rise
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to moral claims, integral to the central capabilities, and even reason.28 These potent ideas are linked with
Nussbaum‘s human dignity in varied ways and point how far-reaching and influential human dignity is
for her approach. Through identifying essential elements of human flourishing, Nussbaum develops a list
of central capabilities that are required for a life worthy of human dignity.

B. Human Dignity and the Central Human Capabilities
Nussbaum delineates ten capabilities which she argues ―are all, each and every one, fundamental
entitlements of citizens, all necessary for a decent and dignified human life.‖ 29 Dignity is integrally related to Nussbaum‘s capabilities approach because ―dignity is not defined prior to and independently of the
capabilities, but in a way intertwined with them and their definition…The guiding notion therefore is not
that dignity itself, as if that could be separated from capabilities to live a life, but rather, that of a life with,
or worthy of, human dignity, where that life is constituted, at least in part, by having the capabilities on
the list.‖30 She says that human capabilities are ―what people are actually able to do and to be‖ and are
determined when one can ―argue, by imagining a life without the capability in question, that such a life is
not a life worthy of human dignity.‖ 31 Nussbaum‘s claim is that certain capabilities—as opposed to functionings—are a matter of minimal justice. Once people possess a capability, they can choose whether or
not to act upon it (have it ―functioning‖). Importantly, Nussbaum stresses that, with little exception, the
concern of justice should be providing and ensuring capabilities and not demanding the functioning of
those capabilities for a number of reasons, including respect for autonomy and for the plurality of conceptions of the good.32 Nussbaum illustrates this point by noting that some orthodox religions ―prohibit their
members from access to the popular press and other media,‖ but ―can still support the idea of freedom of
the press as an important value for a democratic society to contain, even though it has nothing much to do
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with their own conception of flourishing.‖ 33 Members of these orthodox religions can endorse freedom of
the press as valuable in society, but choose not to have it functioning in their lives. Even those who
choose not to have a capability functioning, according to Nussbaum, find it valuable to have because
―there is something good about having choice in these matters… the choice to read a free press or not to
read it.‖34 Another example Nussbaum gives is that ―people should be given ample opportunities to lead
a healthy lifestyle, but the choice should be left up to them; they should not be penalized for unhealthy
choices.‖ 35 Respecting people‘s autonomy, which is a part of respecting people‘s dignity for Nussbaum,
involves allowing choice in exercising the capabilities. The choice whether or not to have some capabilities functioning ―is good in part because of the fact of reasonable pluralism: other fellow citizens make
different choices, and respecting them includes respecting the space within which those choices are
made.‖ Nussbaum argues this respect for choice regarding functioning capabilities ensures that those
who do not see some of her central capabilities as necessary for their flourishing human lives (such as the
Orthodox Jews in Brooklyn) will still see the value in keeping on the list those capabilities they do not
have functioning.36
Sometimes, however, functioning should be the concern of justice: ―Only in the area of selfrespect and dignity itself do I think that actual functioning is the appropriate aim of public policy.‖ 37
Since dignity has invaluable worth and plays a fundamental part in the capabilities, it cannot be traded or
compromised, and must be a guaranteed functioning for all people. Dignity cannot be something people
choose not to act upon and expect that choice to be respected. According to Nussbaum, ―it seems important for government to focus on policies that will actually treat people with dignity as citizens and express actual respect for them, rather than policies (whatever those would be) that would extend to citizens
a mere option to be treated with dignity.‖ 38 When she explains why our concern with dignity should be
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functioning rather than capability, she is very straightforward: ―We want political principles that offer
respect to all citizens, and, in this one instance, the principles should give them no choice in the matter.‖ 39
This stance that dignity must be functioning markedly differs from the other capabilities according to
Nussbaum‘s methodology in which choice about which capabilities to utilize is vital to respecting autonomy which, like Kant, Nussbaum sees as related to dignity.40 Nussbaum justifies this difference because
in order for persons to be autonomous, dignity must be respected. For most non-impaired adults, dignity
and self-respect should be functioning. In addition, Nussbaum says the severely cognitively impaired and
children need to have compulsory functioning with respect to education and healthcare. Her concern is
such that these persons do not possess the needed abilities to reason about those issues.41
Nussbaum argues that human dignity is inviolable and equal for all human beings and that each
human being deserves to have the capabilities needed for a flourishing life. The notion of a human being
is a normative idea for Nussbaum:
First of all, the notion of human nature in my theory is explicitly and from the start evaluative, and, in particular, ethically evaluative: among the many actual features of a characteristic human form of life, we select some that seem so normatively fundamental that a
life without any possibility at all of exercising one of them, at any time, is not a fully human life, a life worthy of human dignity, even if the others are present. 42
In this way, she suggests that self-respect and dignity are the basis for capabilities. However, Nussbaum
says, ―I believe the capabilities approach avoids this problem [of determinate content of dignity] insofar
as it considers the account of entitlements not as derived from the ideas of dignity and respect but rather
as ways of fleshing out those ideas.‖ 43 Despite the difficulty of completely reconciling all of Nussbaum‘s
claims about the role of dignity in her approach, it is clear on her view that obtaining each capability is
necessary for a life worthy of human dignity.
39
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As I just noted, Nussbaum is not explicit, and at times unclear, about the role that dignity plays in
her argument.44 Again, dignity and the capabilities are separable in regard to mandated functioning, but at
other times the capabilities are ―implicit in the idea of a life worthy of human dignity.‖ 45 Regardless of
dignity‘s exact relationship to the capabilities, dignity plays an important role in the development and the
resulting list of human capabilities. Over the years, Nussbaum has developed and revised her list of central human capabilities. Nussbaum says her approach is a political, not metaphysical, project, producing
political goals which must be attained at a threshold level. Nussbaum believes that her current list reflects
central human capabilities, including 1) life, 2) bodily health, 3) bodily integrity, 4) senses, imagination,
and thought, 5) being able to have emotional attachments to entities outside of ourselves, 6) practical reason to form a conception of the good, 7) affiliation and nondiscrimination, 8) living in relation to other
animals and nature, 9) play, and 10) having control (to the extent possible) over one‘s environment.46
Nussbaum claims that principles of minimal justice can be fashioned from her list of central human capabilities.
As noted, rationality is not the source of dignity on Nussbaum‘s account, which makes a distinct
departure from a Kantian perspective. Nussbaum believes that a fundamental focus on rationality will
lead us to fail to respect some humans as bearers of human dignity and also lead us to fail to respect important aspects of humanity as sources of human dignity. 47 However, by not making rationality the
source of dignity, Nussbaum does not denigrate or eliminate rationality entirely from her conception.
One of Nussbaum‘s central human capabilities is that human beings are ―able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason – to do these things in a ‗truly human‘ way.‖ 48 Like all other capabilities, rationality (but not necessarily its functioning) needs to be ensured in order for a life worthy of human dignity.
Nussbaum argues that incorporating rationality in this way encapsulates the special role rationality plays
44
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in lives worthy of human dignity, but not to the exclusion of other human characteristics as well as being
able to include humans with varying capacities for reason. Though not all humans will be able to fully
utilize the capability of rationality, all individuals are still entitled to the capabilities. Hence, this view
demonstrates how Nussbaum seeks to ensure capabilities to all, which would include rationality. In this
manner, Nussbaum is able to account for rationality being included as a capability constituting a life worthy of human dignity while simultaneously acknowledging that utilizing this capability for some may be
complex.

C. Nonhuman Animal Dignity
In order to highlight the common intuition that nonhuman animals possess a kind of dignity,
Nussbaum opens her discussion of justice for nonhuman animals in Frontiers of Justice with an example.
Nussbaum cites an Indian court that ruled the mistreatment of some circus animals‘ forced them to live
―undignified‖ lives. The animals were ―squeezed into cramped and filthy cages, starved, terrorized, and
beaten, given only the minimal care that would make them presentable in the ring the following day.‖ 49
For Nussbaum, the humans who perpetrated these undignified actions against the circus animals were, in
fact, guilty of committing an injustice. 50 To mirror common intuitions, as Nussbaum thinks her approach
does, the reaction of the Indian court needs to reflect the view of many others who agree that these circus
animals were living an undignified life and suffered injustice. Another example that nonhuman animals
intuitively possess dignity comes from Elizabeth Anderson who argues ―the fact that we can conceive of
mocking a dog reflects our recognition that dogs have dignity that we ought to respect. We would be
rightly outraged at some fool who turned a dog into a figure of ridicule by spray-painting graffiti on its
fur. We could even say that such treatment violates the dog‘s right to dignified treatment.‖ 51 Nussbaum
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argues that her conception of dignity can accommodate cases such as these and explain these common
intuitions.
Nussbaum claims that human dignity is a kind of animal dignity, and she thinks her account can
be expanded to explain the kind of dignity possessed by nonhuman animals. Importantly, it is her view
that a dignified life for a particular animal is species-specific.52 Nussbaum says of the expansion of the
capabilities approach to include nonhuman animals: ―The core of the approach, as we have said, is that
animals are entitled to a wide range of capabilities to function, those that are most essential to a flourishing life, a life worthy of the dignity of each creature. Animals have entitlements based upon justice.‖ 53
Expansion of her conception of dignity addresses growing concerns about justice for nonhuman animals
because, on her view, the animal‘s dignity is associated with capabilities that must be ensured for all
members of its species. Again, Nussbaum‘s view of dignity when it comes to animals is species-specific,
and she says,
The species norm is evaluative, as I have insisted; it does not simply read off norms from
the way nature actually is. But once it we have judged that a capacity is essential for a
life with human dignity, we have a very strong moral reason for promoting its flourishing
and removing obstacles to it. The same attitude to natural powers that guides the approach in the case of human beings guides it in the case of other animals. 54
Each animal has dignity in the flourishing and striving appropriate for its species; animals need to be ensured central species-specific capabilities in order to flourish. Ensuring these capabilities, as determined
to be appropriate for each species of animal that Nussbaum includes (all of whom are sentient, nonstationary animals), will partly constitute a life worthy of the appropriate kind of dignity for the species.55
Importantly, nonhuman animals like chimpanzees or dolphins are not included in Nussbaum‘s conception
of justice for their comparisons to humans and comparable levels of functioning, but instead because of
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their own species‘ dignity. Nussbaum‘s arguments for a species-specific dignity allow a multi-faceted
approach to capabilities which ensures that nonhuman animals can be included in Nussbaum‘s conception
of justice and can flourish accordingly.
Given how Nussbaum understands human dignity, it is easy to develop her conception of dignity
for nonhuman animals. For each species, we should consider its characteristic activities and the capabilities central to that species‘ flourishing. For guidance, she says nonhuman animals need life, bodily health
and integrity, emotions, practical reason, play, and control over one‘s environment. 56 The central capabilities list for nonhuman animals mirrors the fundamental ideas behind the central human capabilities list,
but Nussbaum allows that each species has a species norm that defines a life worthy of dignity for that
particular species of animal and allows us to flesh out the particulars of her central capabilities list as appropriate for each species. The entitlements provided by the capabilities approach are ―species-specific
and based upon their characteristic forms of life and flourishing‖ meaning that ―though the more concrete
specification of each capability will lead ultimately to a plurality of lists, it seems the big general categories…offer good guidance.‖ 57 Nussbaum believes that the sentient, non-stationary animal species she intends to include in her scope of dignity all require the same basic needs she has included in her central
capabilities list.
It may be objected that some of these capabilities are not appropriate for all the species which
Nussbaum aims to include. Nussbaum declares after her ―Play‖ capability, ―[t]his is obviously central to
the lives of all sentient animals.‖58 Yet, it seems apparent that one will not find hammerhead sharks playing soccer or macaws challenging one another to checkers, forcing one to ask: is play really as obviously
central to the lives of nonhuman animals as Nussbaum claims? However, Nussbaum immediately goes
on to explain:

56
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It calls for many of the same policies we have already discussed: protection of adequate
space, light, and sensory stimulation in living places, and above all, the presence of other
species members. 59
Though ―play‖ as in the games in which humans engage is clearly too farfetched to be required by all sentient animals, Nussbaum‘s clarification that she intends for animals to not be isolated in dark, dull environments does seem to fit her goal of intuitive ideas that many already have about nonhuman animals.
Ensuring that nonhuman animals can flourish in a stimulating environment seems a more reasonable
claim than the capability of ―play‖ might initially appear, and Nussbaum‘s basic explanation can neutralize some of the initial critics‘ responses. Nussbaum‘s other capabilities also address the same level of
basic need. As Nussbaum delineates that which she deems central, she is careful to describe the central
capabilities as open to interpretation according each species, thus reducing speciest concerns.
Ultimately, Nussbaum gives only an outline of each of the central capabilities for nonhuman animal and limits her scope to sentient, non-stationary beings.60 Nussbaum seeks to provide a much broader
account of justice for nonhuman animals than what would be allowed by Kantian conceptions about dignity rooted in rationality. Since dignity is a foundational aspect of her capabilities and the result of the
capabilities is a life worth of species-specific dignity, including a broad scope of dignity is vital to founding Nussbaum‘s goals. Dignity does not need to be associated solely with human flourishing and with
human goals.61 Instead, the striving and flourishing which occurs in a multitude of ways for many different animals provide a basis for each animal‘s species-specific dignity. The flourishing and striving of the
individual members of different species are what will need to be ensured by the species-specific central
capabilities to live a life worthy of the dignity of that creature. 62 Nussbaum acknowledges that nonhuman

59

Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 400.
Nussbaum, ―Human Dignity and Political Entitlements,‖ 365.
61
Nussbaum, Martha C, "Beyond ‗Compassion and Humanity‘: Justice for Nonhuman Animals," Animal Rights:
Current Debates and New Directions, Eds. Sunstein, Cass R. and Martha C. Nussbaum (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 307.
62
Nussbaum, ―Beyond Compassion,‖ 312-313.
60

14
animals also need self-respect and non-humiliation as part of their flourishing, which gives nonhuman
animals a dignified life.63

II. Kant and Dignity
As noted, Nussbaum understands her account of dignity as a rival to Kant‘s, but she thinks when
the two views are compared, her view is superior insofar as her view can easily account for the intuition
that both humans with severe mental impairments and sentient, non-stationary nonhuman animals have
dignity. I will now consider Kant‘s conception of dignity and its implications for human beings with
mental impairments and nonhuman animals. On Kant‘s view, dignity is a kind of value. Although Kant
says that things with a price ―can be replaced by something else as its equivalent,‖ he claims that things
with dignity have the sort of value for which there is no value equivalent. 64 He further describes dignity
as ―unconditional, incomparable worth.‖ 65 For Kant, it is in virtue of possessing rationality that things
have dignity. Kant argues that what is unique about rational nature is that ―it sets itself an end.‖66 And,
he claims that rational choice is both the condition of value of all things without rational nature and itself
unconditionally valuable.67 Regarding the former, Kant says ―that which constitutes the condition under
which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely relative worth, that is, a price, but an inner
worth, that is, dignity.‖ 68 Importantly, rational nature is tied to Kant‘s notion of autonomy, the ability to
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choose an end and to legislate oneself to work toward that end. Autonomy ―which determines all worth,
must for that very reason have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth.‖ 69 Autonomous
creatures are able to legislate ends which can be universalized. Hence, Kant says, the capacity for autonomy ―is…the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.‖70
As Christine Korsgaard notes, rational creatures are distinct from other creatures insofar as they
are ―the only animals whose conduct is subject to moral guidance and moral evaluation.‖ 71 Kant says that
central to the notion of a rational being is that he must ―regard himself as giving the universal law through
all the maxims of his will.‖ 72 The moral law, understood as the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative, requires that one ―act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the
same time will that it become a universal law.‖ 73 Rational beings are both the legislators of and subjects
of the moral law on Kant‘s view. He says that the ―dignity of humanity consists just in this capacity to
give universal law, though with the condition of also being subject itself to this very lawgiving.‖ 74 Importantly, those who possess rationality do not always act rationally, but a person acting immorally still
has dignity.75 Immoral people possess dignity because they have autonomy and the capacity to set ends;
they are simply choosing not to act upon universalizable maxims.

A. Kant and Animality
Non-rational creatures such as human beings without the capacity for rationality and nonhuman
animals do not possess dignity on Kant‘s view. However, as Kant and those sympathetic to his view have
made clear, his theory does not imply that rational creatures can treat non-rational creatures or their own
non-rational nature any way they want. Instead, Kant argues that rational beings have a duty to treat the
69
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―nonrational part of creation‖ well. 76 Kant gives examples of what he sees as good treatment of nonhuman animals that seem to demonstrate sensitivity and compassion for animals. When humans kill animals, they should do so ―quickly (without pain).‖ Also, humans who use animals for work should not
―strain them beyond their capacities (such as he himself must submit to).‖ Kant recognizes that humans
rely on and use nonhuman animals for work and food and even accepts that some nonhuman animals
should be treated ―just as if they were members of the household,‖ and Kant is adamant that the nonhuman animals should not be abused. He claims ―agonizing physical experiments for the sake of mere
speculation, when the end could also be achieved without these, are to be abhorred.‖ 77 Rational creatures‘
duties with regard to animality do not arise from the value of animality, but are strictly duties to oneself,
because Kant argues that mistreatment of non-rational animals inures one to suffering and makes the mistreater of animals more likely to treat rational beings badly.78
Again, although Kant recognizes that rational creatures have duties with regard to their animal
nature and with regard to non-rational creatures, he does not recognize animality as a source of dignity.
With respect to persons‘ own animal nature, Kant recognizes animality is a reality of human life, but he
refers to it as the ―crude state of Nature‖ from which man must pull himself up through education and
morality.79 Indeed, he says animality is not fitting for our humanity, and ―morally practical reason commands it absolutely and makes this end [diminishing ignorance by instruction and correction of errors] his
duty, so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him.‖ 80 Kant understands human beings as rational creatures who must fight against their animality as it is opposed to their rationality: ―the
human being has a duty to cultivate the crude dispositions of his nature, but which the animal is first
raised into a human being.‖81
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B. Kantians on Animal Nature
Contemporary philosophers working in the Kantian tradition face tough challenges concerning
the value of animality and non-rational creatures. Many philosophers in the Kantian tradition are also
sympathetic to the notion that nonhuman animals have intrinsic value. Two prominent Kantians, Allen
Wood and Christine Korsgaard, present possible interpretations of Kant which address the dignity of and
duties to humans with profound mental impairments as well as nonhuman animals.
Consider the view of contemporary Kantian Allen Wood. Wood supports the logocentric aspects
of the Kantian tradition, meaning that ―it is based on the idea that rational nature, and it alone, has absolute and unconditional value.‖ 82 In Kant‘s theory, according to Wood, to respect humanity, we must respect humanity in an embodied person, which Wood calls the ―personification principle.‖83 However,
Wood argues respecting rational nature ―as an end in itself sometimes requires us to behave with respect
toward nonrational beings if they bear the right relations to rational beings. Such relations…include having rational nature only potentially, or virtually, or having has it in the past, or having parts of it or necessary conditions of it.‖ 84 In this way, Wood argues rational beings must respect rational nature in the ―abstract,‖85 including the fragmentary rationality Wood credits to nonhuman animals. Wood argues that
eliminating the personification principle will also eliminate Kant‘s division of duties between duties rational creatures have in regard to other creatures and duties to other rational creatures (or to themselves).
Instead, ―this rejection [of the personification principle] opens the way for us to recognize, solely on the
basis of Kant‘s logocentric principle and without introducing any value outside that of rational nature,
duties regarding beings which are not based on or derived from any duties toward rational beings.‖ 86
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Wood notes that ―once the personification principle is rejected, Kant‘s distinction between duties toward
and duties in regard to a being ceases to be either sharp or important.‖87
By having duties to respect rationality in all its possible forms, Wood has developed a way to include respecting both humans and nonhuman animals (who would not meet Kant‘s capacity to set ends
and a fully rational nature). Respect for fragmentary rationality is also present for Wood in the way people treat children, people with mental impairments, and even dead corpses of humans because not respecting them would show contempt for their potential, fragmentary, or previous rationality.88 He acknowledges Kant would not agree with him, but says, ―the important thing, though, is not what Kant would say,
but rather what is required by a reasonable interpretation of [Kant‘s] basic principle that rational nature
should be respected as an end in itself.‖ 89 Wood‘s ideas satisfy the concern that nonhuman animals and
humans with severe cognitive impairments are respected due to their own fragmentary rational nature.
Wood does not claim that animality as such has dignity, but his view offers a ―logocentric‖ explanation of
why we might think many human beings with profound mental impairments and many nonhuman animals
possess dignity.
Another contemporary Kantian, Christine Korsgaard, recognizes that Kantian theories need some
way to address duties to those incapable of making autonomous, rational choices. If non-rational creatures are not considered to be ends-in-themselves, then it raises questions about whether it is acceptable to
use non-rational creatures as mere means. However, it seems troublesome to treat children, the mentally
impaired, and nonhuman animals as only tools to be used for our own ends. 90 Korsgaard‘s interpretation
of Kant argues that children and adults with injuries, illnesses, or profound mental impairments for the
most part ―are rational beings. Some of them are, for various reasons, unable to reason well.‖91 Howev-
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er, she believes they are still rational beings, and other rational beings have obligations to them as such.
Korsgaard, however, faces greater difficulty addressing obligations humans have with regard to nonhuman animals.
Korsgaard sees the nexus of the problem in the concept of ―value.‖ As rational creatures, people
are the source of value, because value stems from legislative acts, which can only be committed by rational creatures who ―matter to themselves: who experience and pursue their own good.‖ 92 These beings
who must also have rationality and autonomy to set legislative maxims are considered to be ―ends-inthemselves‖ for both Kant and Korsgaard in the sense that they ―give the force of law to [their] claims, by
participation in moral legislation…If we have obligations concerning animals, they can only follow from
laws that we legislate ourselves.‖ 93 Ends-in-themselves can create value and moral order out the world in
which they live; therefore, they can also extend the moral order to include nonhuman animals, since ―laws
are by their very nature are universal, according to Kant, and a universal law can extend its protection to
someone who did not participate, and could not have participated, in its legislation.‖ 94 Korsgaard argues
it does not follow that rational creatures have to limit their value and moral obligations only to other rational creatures. In fact, ―the decision to regard ourselves as the source of legitimate normative claims is
the original act that brings the world of normative reasons and values into existence. But what we decide
to treat as the source of legitimate normative claims is not just our autonomous nature.‖95
Also, Korsgaard recognizes that pursuit of the good is not limited solely to rational creatures.
Many animals seem to have a sense of self that situates them in the world, and she says that by the notion
something is ―good for an animal, we mean that it is good from its point of view. Because we are animals, we have a natural good in this sense, and it is to this that our incentives are directed…But it is our
natural good, in this sense, that we confer normative value when we value ourselves as ends-in-
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themselves. It is therefore our animal nature, not just our autonomous nature that we take to be an end-initself.‖96 By noting how we can give animal nature value, Korsgaard is able draw comparisons between
aspects of life valued by rational humans and also nonhuman animals. Even when doing specifically human activities which involve the combination of our rationality and our animality, for example, doing philosophy or science, ―we are in a sense valuing our animal nature, for we are still conferring normative
value on the kind of natural good characteristic of creatures who experience and pursue their own
good.‖97 Humans ―construct rational order‖ out of the same features and ―goods of life that we share with
other animals.‖ 98
Once Korsgaard has drawn the connection between the aspects of animality valued by rational
humans and nonhuman animals, she recognizes that these aspects of animality are considered to be endsin-themselves, and consequently under direct moral obligation. In sum, Korsgaard argues that ―in taking
ourselves to be ends-in-ourselves we legislate that the natural good of a creature who matters to itself is
the source of normative claims. Animal nature is an end-in-itself, because our own legislation makes it
so. And that is why we have duties to other animals.‖ 99 Ultimately, Korsgaard works within the Kantian
tradition of rationality-based dignity but is able to conclude that humans do have moral obligations to
nonhuman animals.

III. Differences between Kant and Nussbaum:
Both Nussbaum and Kant argue that dignity is integral to our understanding of how other creatures should be treated. Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity allows for the recognition of dignity in many
species of animals who, she claims, are owed justice. Kant, however, claims that only rational creatures
have dignity, and he thinks that we only have obligations to rational creatures, although he thinks our obligations to rational beings constrain how we can treat animality in persons and nonhuman animals; he
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allows that nonhuman animals and non-rational humans should be treated well, given duties one has to
oneself. Kantians such as Wood and Korsgaard indicate there may be direct obligation to non-rational
creatures in a Kantian framework: they offer interpretations of Kantian theory that obligates rational creatures to humans who would not be considered rational for Kant and also to nonhuman animals. The differences between Kant and Nussbaum matter for issues concerning to whom justice is owed as well as
what justice requires and why. For Nussbaum, nearly all humans and many nonhuman animals are dignified creatures, and they should all be ensured the species-specific central capabilities they need to live
lives worthy of their species-specific dignity.
Nussbaum claims her conception of dignity and her consequent view of minimal justice is superior to Kant‘s (and Kantian theorists‘). Since Kant claims that only beings with rationality possess dignity,
Nussbaum labels herself distinctly as a ―non-Kantian.‖100 She stresses that Kantian dignity presents a
false dichotomy by separating human nature‘s animality and its rationality. Instead, for her, rationality is
inseparably intertwined with humans‘ animal nature. The Kantian ―split‖ is untenable and unrealistic according to Nussbaum: ―It is important to notice that the [Kantian] split goes wrong in both directions: it
suggests, as I have said, that our rationality is independent of our vulnerable animality; and it also suggests that animality, and non-human animals, lack intelligence, are just brutish and ‗dumb.‘‖ 101 For
Nussbaum, rationality-based dignity artificially divorces rationality from animality. When theorists locate dignity in rationality, they often fail to appreciate that the fact that normal human beings are not always rational, but their dignity seems cohesive throughout their lives. 102 Childhood, illness, deteriorating
health, and psychological stress all can create times in the normal lives of humans in which individuals
are not rational.
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Nussbaum identifies four distinct problems with the Kantian split between animality and rationality, and she believes that these four points demonstrate the superiority of her conception of dignity over
Kant‘s. However, she does not sufficiently expound her points or defend her claims. I will critically assess each of the four problems Nussbaum believes arise from the Kantian split of rationality from animality, and I will defend Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity as superior in regard to humans with severe cognitive impairments and nonhuman animals.

A. Dignity and Rational Animals
First, Nussbaum says, the Kantian split between rationality and animality ―ignores the fact that
our dignity just is the dignity of a certain sort of animal.‖ 103 Kant discusses rationality as if it is a capacity
independent of an animal being. For Kant, ―a human being‘s duty to himself as a moral being only (without taking his animality into consideration) consists in what is formal in the consistency of the maxims of
his will with the dignity of humanity in his person.‖ 104 Moral obligation is separate from the ―subjective‖
impulses of nature ―having to do with man‘s animality.‖ 105 Though Kant acknowledges that humans are
intertwined with their animality, animal nature is distinct from that which gives them dignity. However,
as Nussbaum notes, rationality is a capacity of animals. 106 Indeed, rational capacity stems from the physical constitution of some animal beings. It simply seems unintelligible or, at least, otherworldly to think of
rationality as distinct from the animal creatures in which it is found.
Korsgaard cites Kant‘s anthropological story of humans developing rationality, in which humans
in the Garden of Eden gradually become self-conscious and aware of our mortality. Korsgaard mirrors
Kant‘s language in which human rationality differentiates humans from their ―fellow creatures.‖ This
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fellowship points to a common starting point and shared features. 107 Korsgaard indicates that rational animals recognize in themselves things common to animal nature, such as responding to incentives and having a self-conception. For Korsgaard, our animal nature seems to be something we recognize in other
animals and apply to humans, rather than an abstraction of features humanity shares with other animals
that is imposed on nonhuman animals by rational humans. Of interest, again, Korsgaard recognizes that
rational beings treat their animal nature as an end-in-itself: ―we confer normative value when we value
ourselves as ends-in-themselves. It is therefore our animal nature, not just our autonomous nature, that we
take to be an end-in-itself.‖108 Korsgaard uses that point as part of her justification for persons‘ obligations to animals. She claims that each rational being treats his or her own animal nature as an end because he or she understands that each animal has a self-conception and can experience ―its own good and
pursues it as an end of its actions to that extent matters to itself.‖ 109
Again, Korsgaard says that when humans speak about something as ―naturally good for an animal, we mean that it is good from its point of view.‖ 110 This leads Korsgaard to conclude that humans
legislate normative claims which promote and protect this sense of natural good for the creature. Insofar
as we legislate in favor of this natural good, we are obligated to nonhuman animals. 111 This is telling because Korsgaard recognizes animality has value and, consequently, is included in the scope of moral obligations. She recognizes the importance of addressing the value that animality has is tightly linked with
our rationality. But, in order to include animality into a Kantian approach, Korsgaard must stretch value
in ways that may conflict with other Kantians‘ interpretations. Furthermore, the way in which Korsgaard
understands the relationship between rationality and animality is distinct from Nussbaum insofar as
Korsgaard‘s view is concerned with the value that humans attribute to nonhuman animals and humans‘
107
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own animal nature. In contrast, Nussbaum‘s conception of human dignity begins with the claim that human dignity stems from the dignity of one type of animal. That is, she develops her view of rationality
based on our experience as embodied creatures. Nussbaum does not try to artificially divorce or elevate
the capacity, as we understand it, from its embodied reality.

B. The Value of Animality
This leads to Nussbaum‘s second point regarding the Kantian split: dignity is inherent in animality. Failing to see this ―leads us to slight aspects of our own lives that have worth and distort our relation
to other animals.‖ 112 Nussbaum often cites examples to suggest the value of animality. In that spirit, few
would deny that infants have dignity (even infants with severe cognitive impairments) and that, as a result, it would be wrong to treat them in certain ways. Nussbaum says:
I believe that we need to delve deeper, redesigning the political conception of the person,
bringing rational and the animal into a more intimate relation with one another, and acknowledging that there are many types of dignity in this world, including the dignity of mentally
disabled children and adults, the dignity of the senile demented elderly, and the dignity of babies at the breast. 113
Such beings do not possess the capacity for rationality, even if they previously had it or currently have the
potential for it. Most people, I think, judge these beings to be dignified not because of their past or potential capacities but because of capacities they currently possess. Consider a human being who has advanced stages of Alzheimer‘s disease or a being who has been in an accident and lost most cognitive
function.114 In these cases, the capacity for rationality is severely compromised. We think such beings
have dignity and, arguably, not simply because of their former capacities and lives these beings once enjoyed, but again, because of current features about these individuals such as their human need and abilities.
112
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Kantians like Wood would claim that non-rational creatures possess some fragmented rationality.
This move allows for the inclusion of non-rational creatures into Kantian theory, but this move also seems
problematic for two reasons. First, it arguably does not match our judgment about why certain beings
have dignity. Here it is also helpful to think about judgments concerning nonhuman animals. As mentioned in the discussion regarding animal dignity, Nussbaum appeals to the Indian court case concerning
circus animals. The court rules that the animals‘ cramped, filthy, demeaning lives were ―undignified.‖115
The reaction that the circus animals had their dignity violated by their living conditions is not because of
the dignity these beings possess by virtue of their fragmented rationality but, rather, the judgment that
these beings are dignified and suffered injustice because of their horrid living conditions and demeaning
treatment.
Second, Wood‘s argument for fragmented rationality seems to really stretch the Kantian view. By
determining other creatures to have ―fragmented rationality,‖ Wood points to the idea that those with a
whole, or non-fragmented, rationality are in some sense more complete or even superior to creatures with
only partial rationality. Identifying creatures as fragmented or not in their rationality speaks to Nussbaum‘s worry of a distorted view of the relationship between humans and nonhuman animals or other
humans with severe cognitive impairments. It would be problematic for Nussbaum if those with nonfragmented rationality are considered to be higher in the scope of inter-species relations. Also, in order
for Wood to appeal to fragmented rationality, he argues against what he calls the ―personification principle‖ which says that rationality must be embodied in persons.116 Wood says that Kant must reject this
principle, but it is questionable if Kant would agree. For Kant, there will be some humans excluded from
his conception of dignity, which Wood acknowledges to be unsettling for some. Wood argues, however,
that ―we see that a reasonable interpretation of the principle of humanity‖ includes many cognitively impaired humans and nonhuman animals Kant would exclude. 117 However, in order to reach this point,
Wood must substantially revise Kant‘s view. Wood again defends his approach and again says of his in115
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terpretation of Kant: ―The important thing, though, is not what Kant would say, but rather what is required by a reasonable interpretation of his basic principle that rational nature should be respected as an
end in itself.‖118 Kant would agree about respecting rational nature, but how much of an interpretation
would still be ―reasonable‖ to Kant and other Kantians? Wood remains rooted in Kant‘s theories and his
commitment to rationality based dignity, but his complicated interpretation seems to stretch the boundaries of Kant‘s original conception of dignity.
Once the value of animality is recognized, it has important implications for how we ought to treat
human beings, and especially, nonhuman animals. Nussbaum worries the Kantian split will lead persons
to have unwarranted airs and unjustifiably treat of other animals. For example, there are many humans
today who are comfortable using animals as mere means rather than seeing them as fellow dignified creatures. Examples of this phenomenon are prevalent in the current food industry where many consumers
are far removed from their food sources and unquestioningly consume meat which may have been raised
in inhumane conditions or fed artificial additives or hormones to decrease the growth time and increase
marketable portions of the animals. Many chickens are breed to have oversized breasts because the white
meat is in higher demand in the market, or veal calves can be penned and fed artificial milk diets. Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity prompts us to recognize the value of animality. Though humans may still
eat meat for food and use nonhuman animals for labor, recognizing their proper place in the scope of animal dignity will require humans to treat nonhuman animals humanely. Nussbaum argues that all dignified creatures should be ensured certain species-specific central capabilities in a minimally just society.
Since she includes nearly all humans and many nonhuman animals in her scope of justice, each of these
creatures is entitled to a life worthy of species appropriate dignity and, consequently, is a primary subject
of justice.
Again, while Kant or Wood could claim that respect for rational nature requires treating animality
in a certain way, it is important that the value of animality itself be recognized. Korsgaard also is concerned with the treatment of nonhuman animals and the obligations we have to other animals rest in the
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value we confer upon them. In this way, Korsgaard is still reliant upon humans to bestow value upon the
nonhuman animals to which we are obligated. Even if Korsgaard suggests we treat nonhuman animals in
the same way as Nussbaum and recognizes the value of animal nature, her account still seems problematic
insofar as animals are not clearly primary subjects of justice but, instead, brought into the theory through
human recognition of the value of animality. Also, Korsgaard‘s inclusion of nonhuman animals lacks the
parsimony and intuitive elements that come easily to Nussbaum‘s expandable conception of dignity.
Furthermore, while Nussbaum‘s view recognizes the value of animals, it is appropriately speciesspecific. For example, Nussbaum sees a relevant and intuitive distinction between a nonhuman animal,
for example, a chimpanzee with some language ability, and a human with cognitive and developmental
impairments who will never develop language skills. 119 The language ability required for a flourishing
human life is distinctly different from the language abilities that a chimpanzee may or may not develop
throughout his or her flourishing chimpanzee life: ―For chimpanzees, language use is a frill, constructed
by human scientists; their own community does not rely on it…[For disabled humans], some access to
language, preferably through one‘s own development, but, where that is not possible, through guardianship, is essential to a dignified life.‖ 120 This meaningful distinction can be incorporated into Nussbaum‘s
view because the source of dignity for each animal and a dignified life for an animal is species-specific.
Hence, the human without language abilities still maintains full human dignity, and the chimpanzee has
full chimpanzee dignity. Each should have the species-appropriate central capabilities. Nussbaum differentiates the flourishing expected for the species and consequent dignity through species norms, which
―(duly evaluated) tell[] us what the appropriate benchmark is for judging whether a given creature has
decent opportunities for flourishing.‖ 121 Since both forms of dignity require certain capabilities, the creatures are both included as primary subjects in her scope of justice.

119

Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 363-5.
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 364.
121
Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 365.
120

28
C. False Sufficiency
The third concern Nussbaum raises is that emphasizing rationality over animality as the source of
dignity lulls humans into falsely believing that they are self-sufficient.122 This false belief can blind people to their own neediness, mortality, and other animal features. This blindness is problematic when it
hinders people from seeing their interconnectivity and reliance on others in their political community.
Nussbaum ultimately creates a political theory, and the false image people have of themselves as divided
beings affects the way people interact with others. Nussbaum is concerned people will falsely view themselves as isolated individuals. Indeed, it has been an important feminist critique of liberal political philosophy that persons are not independent and self-sufficient. As Nussbaum stresses, we are all needy at
the beginning of life and many of us will again be so later in life, temporarily or permanently. Furthermore, some people are always dependent on others for assistance in meeting their basic needs.123 Historically and currently, women perform much of the work for caring for others, and as Nussbaum says, ―usually without pay, and often without recognition for this work.‖ 124 As a result of their caregiving work,
women have been and continue to be disadvantaged relative to men in other spheres of life. Nussbaum‘s
conception recognizes that dependency is a continuous feature of human life and the work of caring for
dependents is central to the organization of any minimally just society.
Kant‘s heavy emphasis on rationality as the basis of dignity lends itself to the concept that people
enter the social world already complete and autonomous, which is simply false, and it fails to recognize
the dignity of the humans who will never achieve independence due to cognitive impairments. Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity, on the other hand, can easily accommodate the human being through all
stages of her life, from infancy to old age and all different times of dependency throughout. By grounding her conception of dignity in animality, Nussbaum is able to incorporate times of development and
neediness which are a reality of the human condition and communal life.
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D. Human Dependency
Finally, the fourth concern Nussbaum raises is that dividing rationality from animality leads people to wrongly believe that they are ―a-temporal‖ because it fails to recognize times of dependency during
which ―our functioning is very similar to that enjoyed by the mentally impaired or physically handicapped
throughout their lives.‖ 125 For example, times in human lives such as infancy, mental decline, illness, or
injury all cause changes in one‘s rational capacity, but according to Nussbaum, these should not impact
one‘s dignified status. Matching these intuitions with a cohesive theory of dignity is advantageous to
Nussbaum because it seamlessly accommodates the cohesion of dignity throughout one‘s life from infancy to old age without forcing anyone to move in and out of times of dignity.
Since Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity has the capacity to address the concerns she has with
Kant‘s artificial split between animality and rationality, Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity offers a better
starting point for theories wishing to apply to the lives which people actually live. 126 Her sensitivity to the
realities of the neediness and complications of life accepts the temporality in life and appreciates humanity in its place among the other animals. Being aware of the development, illnesses, injuries, and decline
that are a part of human life allows Nussbaum‘s conception of human dignity to remain a consistent political theory which awards dignity according to general intuitions without having to perform mental gymnastics to include most humans and many nonhuman animals and the contingencies and changes which
occur naturally throughout life.
Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity can attend to common intuitions and concerns regarding the
dignity which are seriously problematic for Kant. Because of the construction of Nussbaum‘s conception
of dignity and its ensuing political theories, Nussbaum‘s theory can easily accommodate the intuitive
judgments we have about the dignity of humans and nonhuman animals from the start. Kantians like
Wood and Korsgaard attempt to address some of these concerns, but end up with complicated interpretations of Kant‘s theories. Avoiding any of the nuanced interpretations and stretching the Kantian concep-
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tion of dignity, Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity is simple and consistent. Nussbaum is able to point out
the four main problems she sees in Kantian dignity, and I have argued that these four problems are indeed
difficult for Kant and the Kantians who follow him, and that Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity from animality is better able to address these four problems with a succinct and efficient theory.

IV. Conclusion
Though there are stark differences between Kant and Nussbaum, it is important to recognize that
there are also valuable similarities between the two conceptions that open the door for common ground
and enable further discussion between Nussbaum and those working in the Kantian tradition. Kant‘s and
Nussbaum‘s conceptions point to some areas of overlap in both the constitutive features and implications
of dignity. On Kant‘s view, autonomy is linked with practical reason and is marked as that which possesses dignity. For Nussbaum, ―[human dignity] is indeed characterized, usually, by a kind of rationality,
but rationality is not idealized and set in opposition to animality; it is just garden-variety practical reasoning.‖127 Since rationality is a part of the human species norm, Nussbaum is also committed some degree
of practical reason in a life worthy of human dignity.
Like Kant, Nussbaum regards autonomy as of central importance for justice. She says that ―[i]n
the human case, one way we respect autonomy is to focus on capabilities, not functioning [acting upon
the capabilities], as the … goal.‖ 128 There are many who will, for various reasons, forego acting upon the
capabilities. Nussbaum cites cases like the Amish, where they could see the value in the capability to
vote and will support that capability for all people but will not vote themselves. 129 It would be unjust and
undermine autonomy to force individuals to function in certain ways (in the normal case).
There are other important similarities between Kant and Nussbaum regarding the implications of
recognizing human dignity. Consider the Humanity Formulation of Kant‘s Categorical Imperative: ―the
human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means […]; he
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must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be regarded at
the same time as an end.‖130 These ideas linger in Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity; she says that human beings should not be viewed as mere means for others: ―I argue, further, again relying on the intuitive idea of human dignity, that the capabilities in question should be pursued for each and every person,
treating each as an end and none as a mere tool of the ends of others.‖ 131 She reiterates her alignment
with the Kantian conception of inviolable and unconditional dignity: ―I have also said that the intuitive
ideas of dignity and reciprocity provide excellent guidance, particularly in thinking of the way in which
each person is an end and cannot be sacrificed to a larger social good.‖ 132 Since dignity is valued as an
end-in-itself for Nussbaum, this reflects similar ideas to Kant who says that dignity is beyond price because ―each person is valuable and worthy of respect as an end.‖ 133
Sharing these important features of dignity with Kant further strengthens Nussbaum conception
of dignity because it reinforces the intuitive nature of her conception, even among Kantians who disagree
with her, and it provides a strong basis to encourage ongoing discussion which Nussbaum believes will
revise and strengthen her approach. 134 Though Nussbaum‘s view is promising, there are some lingering
concerns in her conception of dignity that need to be addressed. I cannot adequately cover each in this
thesis, but I will highlight some problems for future research which I see as particularly problematic. I
will first return to the previously mentioned ambiguity in Nussbaum‘s language regarding the role of dignity in the capabilities approach. Second, I will look at questions and implications for Nussbaum regarding conflicting capabilities of various animals. Finally, I will investigate some borderline cases of sentient, non-stationary creatures to expose the difficultly to determining which nonhuman animals are considered dignified and owed justice through the capabilities approach.
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A. Dignity’s Role in the Theory
First, further clarification is needed with respect to dignity‘s exact role in Nussbaum‘s capabilities
approach. As previously mentioned in Section I, on Nussbaum‘s view, dignity both seems to be independent of and inseparable from the central human capabilities. There is a question here whether Nussbaum uses a dignified existence prior to the capabilities or if the capabilities are a constitutive element in
human dignity. On one hand, Nussbaum‘s language indicates that dignity is foundational, prior to the
capabilities, and that providing the central capabilities shows respect for dignity.135 Nussbaum says, ―The
capabilities approach begins from a political conception of the human being, and of a life worthy of the
dignity of a human being.‖ 136 Since the capabilities approach begins with conception of human dignity,
recognizing that dignity gives rise to the central capabilities, and consequently, a life worthy of the dignity the human already possesses. Indicating the foundational role of dignity in forming the capabilities,
she says, ―the political principles I give [the central human capabilities] give shape and content to the abstract idea of dignity.‖ 137 If the capabilities flesh out the abstract idea of dignity, then dignity must independent from the capabilities. This recognition of human dignity at the root of the capabilities seems
clear when Nussbaum says, ―I…have used the approach to provide the philosophical underpinning for an
account of core human entitlements that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all
nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity requires.‖ 138 More explicitly, Nussbaum
shows dignity to be independent of the capabilities when she says, ―We should bear in mind that any child
born into a species has the dignity relevant to that species, whether or not it seems to have the ‗basic capabilities‘ relevant to that species. For that reason, it should also have all the capabilities relevant to that
species, either individually or through guardianship.‖ 139 The language Nussbaum uses seems to indicate
that human dignity is independent of holding any capabilities. Dignity is prior to the capabilities because
respect for it spurs the principles at the foundation of the capabilities approach.
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Nussbaum‘s insistence that dignity must be functioning whereas other capabilities only need to be
available also indicates that dignity is prior to the capabilities. 140 Nussbaum claims that ―if we place the
accent firmly on capability rather than functioning, it is a not implausible reconstruction of their thinking
to ascribe to them the thought that a dignified life for a human being requires these capabilities—which
include, of course, the right not to use them.‖ 141 By differentiating functioning dignity from the capabilities, Nussbaum indicates that she not only thinks that dignity is separable from the capabilities, but that it
is also prior to them, since having functioning dignity is necessary to preserving autonomy to choose
which capabilities function in one‘s life.
On the other hand, Nussbaum also uses language at times that points to dignity (in some way) being dependent on or inseparable from the central human capabilities. In a direct contradiction to the previous indications that dignity is independent of the capabilities, Nussbaum says, ―Dignity is not defined
prior to and independently of the capabilities, but in a way intertwined with them and their definition.‖ 142
Dignity is partially constituted by the central capabilities and that having the capabilities results in a life
worthy of human dignity. Nussbaum says, ―It is also argued that dignity is not a value independent of the
capabilities, but that the articulation of the political principles involving capability are (partial) articulations of the notion of a life with human dignity.‖ 143 The ―partial articulation‖ and the instrumental ways
in which Nussbaum talks about the capabilities being related to her conception of human dignity are hinted at, and it is not clear in which ways and how partial the articulations of dignity are. What is clear is
that Nussbaum does not want dignity to increase with each capability one obtains,144 but instead dignity is
somehow intertwined with the capabilities, but not fully resulting from the capabilities. For Nussbaum,
dignity is non-aggregative, so that having more of the capabilities cannot give one more dignity. 145 This
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sentiment points to Nussbaum‘s belief that dignity cannot come from stockpiling different capabilities.
She also repeatedly says that having the capabilities is necessary for a ―life worthy of human dignity.‖
Moreover, Nussbaum adds that humans are worthy of human dignity whether or not they have the
capabilities, but it remains unclear what role dignity plays in Nussbaum‘s theory when she provides ―an
approach that focuses on human capabilities, that is, what people are actually able to do and to be, in a
way informed by an intuitive idea of the dignity of the human being. I identify a list of central human
capabilities, arguing that all of them are implicitly in the idea of a life worthy of human dignity.‖ 146 Here,
Nussbaum says that the capabilities are ―informed by‖ dignity while simultaneously saying that the capabilities are already ―implicit‖ inside of the concept of dignity. Nussbaum is ambiguous whether she is
referencing two different senses of dignity or if dignity plays more than one role in her approach.
In this confusing set-up, it is obvious to the reader that human dignity is powerful and important,
but its exact role in the capabilities approach is not articulated. So in essence, a reading of Nussbaum‘s
numerous comments about dignity can look like they are incompatible—that dignity precedes the capabilities in some way while partly resulting from them. In order to avoid this confusion, Nussbaum could
claim that being a dignified human and having a life worthy of human dignity are separate claims, but it is
far from clear what Nussbaum has in mind. The confusion remains with respect to the role of ―dignity‖ in
Nussbaum‘s approach. The problem rests in her language and may be clarified with further discussion.

B. Conflicting Capabilities
A second concern regarding Nussbaum‘s capabilities approach rests in her brevity regarding conflicting capabilities or what to do when there is a conflict with respect to the provision of capabilities
(within or among species). Nussbaum argues for multiple dignities and recognizes differences among all
the sentient, non-stationary animals which she includes in her approach:
Because the capabilities approach finds ethical significance in the unfolding and flourishing of basic (innate) capabilities—those that are evaluated as both good and central—it
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will also find harm in the thwarting or blighting of those capabilities. More complex
forms of life have more and more complex (good) capabilities to be blighted, so they can
suffer more and different types of harm…Level of life is relevant not because it gives different species differential worth per se, but because the type and degree of harm a creature can suffer varies with its form of life.147
Nussbaum argues that more complex animals can suffer greater harms, and therefore harming them is
considered morally worse than less complex animals, but it is not clear how, or even if, this ranking of
complexity (however it would be performed) is intended to guide a decision making process when capabilities conflict.
Since many creatures have dignity and the provision of the central capabilities for some creatures
may conflict with the provision of the central capabilities for other creatures, there needs to be a way to
adjudicate claims. Nussbaum eliminates the option to adjudicate justice in terms of a creature‘s utility
because various forms of utilitarianism do not support the same goals as the capabilities approach, and
some are even in conflict with her basic principles: ―consequentialism is in tension with liberal respect for
plurality of comprehensive conceptions of good. Sum-ranking treats some as means to the ends of others.
Hedonism and preference Utilitarianism efface the heterogeneity and distinctness of the good [and] ignore
good that do not reside in sentience.‖ 148 Nussbaum stresses that human dignity is the dignity of one type
of animal and the utility of that animal (whether human or not) should not be weighed in the considerations of justice. Instead, dignified animals are all owed at least the minimal justice of their speciesspecific central capabilities, so adjudicating between conflicting claims for minimal justice remains unclear.
Nussbaum acknowledges, ―The world we live in contains persistent and often tragic conflicts between the well-being of human beings and the well-being of animals.‖ 149 She goes on make concessions
that favor human capabilities, such as allowing for the painless killing of animals for meat until we can
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ensure that an all-vegetarian diet does not harm children‘s health. 150 Nussbaum also mentions concerns
about paying for healthcare for all animals may force a reduction in the level of healthcare for humans
and animal medical research,151 but says that each nation ―needs to consider [these questions of conflicting capabilities] for itself when setting the threshold of all the major capabilities. We have not yet even
begun to deliberate about such questions, and I believe that it is premature right now to say what the precise result of such deliberations would be.‖152 To maintain a practical approach, Nussbaum acknowledges
that there will be some harm to animals, but that we should focus on smaller, simpler animals, because the
harm to them will be less,153 and that we should attempt to ―cut back on the abuse of animals.‖ 154 Though
Nussbaum hints at the reality of conflicting capabilities, she appears to endorse favoring (to some extent)
human capabilities when they directly conflict with other nonhuman animals‘ capabilities, but she provides no mechanism to make these decisions. For example, she favors children‘s health over a vegetarian
diet and medical research for humans over the capabilities of the animals used in that research. 155 Nussbaum admits that there is work to be done on the issue of conflicting capabilities, and her cursory glance
at the complicated reality of conflicting capabilities leaves both advocates and critics of her view wondering how to decide which capabilities to promote and which harms are ―lesser‖ for less complex beings.
This omission is glaring because Nussbaum argues that she offers a superior approach to justice for cognitively impaired humans and nonhuman animals, but adjudicating between conflicts of goods and needs in
a world that competes for limited resources is an important feature of any conception of justice.
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C. Animal Dignity
A third complication in Nussbaum‘s conception of dignity needing further development is determining which animals have dignity and what exactly is owed, as a matter of minimal justice, to certain
animals (putting aside species conflicts). Nussbaum admits that each species has its own appropriate dignity, and this is important because dignified creatures are owed justice. Nussbaum limits the discussion
to sentient, non-stationary animals156 and allows that some animals are included and some are not. On the
fringes those decisions seem to make sense: coral and sponges are out while parrots and humpback
whales are in. She discounts mosquitoes because they do not feel pain.157 Nussbaum vaguely points to
what animals she determines to be included in her theory: ―dynamic and not static, that seek expression in
a characteristic form of life,‖ 158 but some grey areas remain. How mobile does a creature have to be in
order to be non-stationary? Also, many creatures have a nervous system and experience sensation, but
how advanced does this experience have to be for Nussbaum to consider them to have ―complex forms of
sentience‖159 in her account?
For example, slugs have a nervous system and can experience sensation, respond to stimuli, and
have pain receptors, so would they be considered sentient?160 They move, however slowly, so they would
also be considered non-stationary. According to Nussbaum‘s criteria, slugs exhibit the features required
for nonhuman animals to have dignity and could be owed the appropriate slug central capabilities and
consequent justice. Though maliciousness to slugs may be distasteful, I am not convinced that slugs are
owed justice. This intuition is evident when the slug is found eating through plants. There does not seem
to be cries of injustice against those who kill slugs that are destroying a human‘s plants. In the case of
crops, one could argue that the plants are needed for food for more complex animals and humans, and so
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the slugs may be sacrificed. However, there are many slugs which destroy garden flowers or lawns that
have no potential to be human sustenance, but there is still no outcry that people are morally wrong by
killing these pesky slugs. Since Nussbaum believes that her theory matches intuitions people have, it
would appear people would not owe the slugs justice, though they are sentient and non-stationary.
With examples such as slugs, it becomes clear that Nussbaum must define more carefully what
nonhuman animals she wishes to include in her conception of animal dignity and consequent justice. If
she includes slugs, it does not seem to match people‘s intuitions. Also, how would one enforce justice for
creatures like slugs? If any remotely sentient, moving creature is dignified and included as a primary subject of justice, the scope of justice could be expansive and overly burdensome. The broadness of the theory would diminish the applicability and efficiency of Nussbaum‘s approach, which has been a major
source of her superiority to Kant in my previous discussion.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: The Central Human Capabilities:
(as given by Martha Nussbaum on Frontiers of Justice, pages 76-8)

1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one‘s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, inducing reproductive health; to be adequately
nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault; including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction
and for choice in matters of reproduction.
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason –
and to do these things in a ―truly human‖ way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific
training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one‘s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to
use one‘s own mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to
both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those
who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience
longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one‘s emotional development blighted by fear
and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be
shown to be crucial in their development.)
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6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection
about the planning of one‘s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious
observance.)
7. Affiliation.
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the
situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting the institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly
and political speech.)
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national
origin.
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for an in relation to animals, plants, and the world
of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control over One’s Environment.
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one‘s life;
having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal
basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

